

congruence to contemporary aspirations for global governance. Indeed, considering realism as conservative makes only sense when one argues from a positivistic perspective. Only from this perspective does realism not seem apt because its proponents argued against the possibility of a general theory, demonstrated the limits of reason, and were critical to the nexus of academia and the government as this helped to reify the political status quo.

Despite this misconstruction of realism that certainly hampers the analysis, Guilhot has managed to bring together an eminent group of scholars which draws attention to and sheds new light into the development of the transatlantic discipline of International Relations.

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Dropping the torch: Jimmy Carter, the Olympic boycott, and the Cold War, Nicholas Evan Sarantakes, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010, 340 pp., \$28.99 (paperback), ISBN 09780521176668

Dropping the Torch provides a significant contribution to the body of work on Jimmy Carter's presidency that attempts to make sense of his unconventional stewardship of US foreign policy. Sarantakes' illustration of Carter's attempt to orchestrate a boycott of the 1980 Summer Olympics in Moscow shows that Carter's enigmatic ways were supported by a culture of insolence and certitude, and one that Sarantakes claims, 'did manage to insult the Soviets just enough to destroy détente and restart the Cold War' (12).

Sarantakes' examination of these events starts with the victory of the US Hockey team in the 1980 Winter Olympics, which, taken together with the success of American Jesse Owens at Hitler's 1936 Olympics, provide two compelling examples of the transcendence of international sports over superpower politics – a lesson Sarantakes argues was lost on Carter as he struggled to conceive of and execute a formidable response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Sarantakes cites documents that show Carter's preference for using non-military 'propaganda and economic tools against the Soviets' and that confirm 'the headwaters of the naïve arrogance that ran through his administration came from the Oval Office itself' (80). Furthermore, Sarantakes reveals a cast of sycophants that supported Carter's ill-founded certitude, in the case of the boycott led by White House Counsel Lloyd Cutler. After a meeting with Carter and other 'domestic political advisors' on 16 January 1980, Sarantakes asserts that Cutler launched an 'inept and amateurish effort to impose Carter's will on the international Olympic movement' (92). Sarantakes further argues 'what made Cutler influential was... his willingness to do exactly as the President wished' (92).

Sarantakes undertook a daunting task in examining the Olympic Boycott of 1980 given the range of actors and institutions, not to mention various languages, which produced multiple venues of research and required the assistance of translators. In

addition to Carter's presidency, Sarantakes includes a careful investigation of the perspective of the International Olympic Committee (IOC), and in particular its then leader, Lord Killanin. Sarantakes shows the complexity of international sports beyond the IOC by including the influence and sovereign authority of many state Olympic committees and sports federations. He explains the predicament Carter's boycott created for the United States Olympic Committee and the risk it created for the 1984 Olympics in Los Angeles. In addition, he demonstrates the impact on the real victims of Carter's boycott – the athletes – who became his unwilling soldiers of sacrifice. In so doing, he produces a well-drawn framework of political intrigue that offers a number of new avenues of research for both diplomatic and sports historians.

Sarantakes principal claim, however, that Carter's boycott 'had been the final blow' that ended détente between the United States and the Soviet Union could benefit from more support. The Soviet resolution he cites that assigns blame to the United States for 'undermining détente' provides little more than a laundry list of Soviet grievances designed for their own propaganda purposes (230). Sarantakes makes a very persuasive argument that the boycott was an ineffective response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and a clear illustration of Carter's dysfunctional White House, which makes it difficult to conclude that the boycott accomplished anything, let alone the end of détente and the re-starting of the Cold War. One could also argue that the Soviet's tit-for-tat boycott of the 1984 Olympics in Los Angeles is itself evidence of the continuation of détente – of a carefully measured response that mitigated escalation toward military confrontation. One might also observe that détente survived largely as a bi-product of Carter's neglect of US–Soviet relations, as he chose to make the pursuit of new treaties with Panama and peace in the Middle East superior priorities early in his presidency. Finally, one might argue that the election of Ronald Reagan had more to do with re-starting the Cold War than Carter's Olympic boycott.

In any case, Sarantakes' *Dropping the Torch* is a feat of scholarship to admire. It is a book that will stimulate much discussion and inspire new avenues of research.

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Globalizing de Gaulle: international perspectives on French foreign policies, 1958–1969, ed. Christian Neunlist, Anna Locher and Garret Martin, Lanham, MD, Rowman and Littlefield, 2010, 318 pp., \$80 (clothbound), ISBN 0-7391-4248-8

This is an excellent volume for anyone seeking to better understand the foreign policy of France during the era of General Charles de Gaulle's time in power between 1958 and 1969. The Preface by the three editors and especially the Introduction by Mark Kramer are useful summaries of the state of play for our understanding the